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Governmental and corporate spying are no longer a surprising facet of  everyday life 
in the digital age. In this paper, I expand upon the implications at stake in debates on 
autonomy, privacy, and anonymity, and I arrive at a definition of  anonymity involving 
the flow between traits and the inability to connect them based on deliberate non-
publication on a structurally social level. I argue that cultivating the space to remain 
anonymous is useful for distanced association with oneself  in the purely private 
internal sphere, furthering a more fully examined inner association not based on a 
future already predicted or prematurely acted upon. The privilege of  anonymity is a 
precondition for genuine self-relation. Later, I argue doubly against the “nothing to 
hide” argument, i.e., if  one has nothing to hide, one has nothing to fear. Firstly, the 
actionability and fabrication of  data make it such that it is always at risk of  being 
interpreted as unsafe. Secondly, this argument is predicated on hiddenness as 
negative, which I answer with an analysis of  the functionality of  anonymity 
concerning personal growth. 
I. Introduction  
What we search and put on personal devices, who owns that data, and what they do with 
that information, is at the center of  an important debate on privacy containing various opinions on 
what is being protected and why. This debate is not merely about words and concepts, rather, as 
exemplified by the extent of  corporate and governmental spying in this country, all of  us are 
affected, despite how technologically involved one may be. As I will show in this paper, at stake are 
the philosophical realms of  autonomous deliberation, agency and personhood that underlie our 
actions in the digital age. These are topics that are often neglected, as we can see by the general 
public’s blind acceptance of  information banks, and even their willing participation in handing out 
data in forms such as social media and personalized biological information like 23andMe. Once our 
data is publicized, unbeknownst to us, it is not only wrung out for its future use but also may be 
manipulated in such a way that can affect how we relate to others—and, importantly, even to 
ourselves—when being anonymous is no longer a choice. As I will explain below, voyeurism in the 
form of  unsolicited viewership can come in many forms, and often governmental and corporate 
spying rip away autonomy, deciding the future of  personal control of  information and its 
implications.  
 In this paper, I argue that the concept of  anonymity, which I will define in detail below, 
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ought to be a central focal point of  the debate on privacy and autonomy, especially in the context of  
data-driven, algorithmic, and predictive technologies. If  autonomy, the ability of  an agent to act on 
the basis of  her own authority over herself, is to be self-authored and reflective of  personal 
deliberation in terms of  growth, then anonymity ought to be protected and its centrality brought 
into focus. As I will show, defending anonymity as central to autonomy can elucidate key aspects of  
important debates about privacy.  
 To illustrate the centrality of  anonymity in relation to privacy, I will also argue against the 
“nothing to hide” argument. Daniel J. Solove explains the argument as follows: government 
surveillance poses no threat to privacy unless unlawful activity is uncovered, in which case it should 
not be private—legal activity and the surveillance thereof  is nothing to worry about.  I will refute 1
this argument in two ways. My first strategy will be to challenge the first premise of  the argument: 
that quotidian and legal activity can be transparent and safe. As I will explain below, movability of  
data, how it is disseminated and by whom allows algorithms and data banks—particularly those 
sustained by corporations and government—to take raw personal data and create new repossessed 
data sets. A repossessed data set is a data set that is taken from one data collecting entity and placed, 
differently categorized, into another database. The information itself  is not necessarily changed, but 
its movement dissociates it further from where it came and its separation may shift the way that it 
will be used in the future. Once repossessed by the recording technology, and the industry behind it, 
these data sets are used for further algorithmic purposes.  Eventually, that individual’s data does not 2
truly belong to the agent from whom it was taken any longer. It belongs to banks of  data that are 
stored and continuously revisited. This means that even quotidian and legal activity is not safe from 
how its actionability will be utilized. This is, of  course, exacerbated by the fact that even if  such an 
agent had access to such data, it would be incomprehensible to them without the algorithmic 
technology required to decipher its actionability.  
Secondly, the nothing to hide argument does not consider how the exposition and utilization 
of  data in the form of  institutionalized surveillance policy and simpler listening devices in cell 
phones, for example, reflects back on personhood and growth, which will depict the implications of  
1. Daniel J. Solove, “‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of  Privacy. Informational 
Privacy: Philosophical Foundations and Legal Implications),” San Diego Law Review, vol. 44, no. 4, 2007, pp. 745–772
2. Following Louise Amoore, I will use the term “actionability” to refer to the way in which data becomes 
usable. By this I mean that traceable data like credit card purchases, flights, and numerical identifiers like social security 
for instance are used to glean more information about a person or her future actions. Amoore’s work refers to more than 
the ways in which already established data points are used but how the absence of  data is also acted upon. Louise 
Amoore, “Data Derivatives: On the Emergence of  a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times,” Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 
28, no. 6, 2011, 24–43.
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a misled approach to privacy that neglects the value of  anonymity. As we will see, there are some 
things worth keeping for oneself  independently of  whether or not they are things that would be 
considered “something to hide.” In one sense, this means that this argument misses the main point 
of  both privacy and anonymity: that we all have something to hide.   3
 The potential for invasion of  personal life is ripe, as is the exposing feeling it engenders 
even, and perhaps especially, when it is implicit.  For example, unless I share information willingly, I 4
do not want others to have access to certain traits about me, facts about how those traits are related 
to each other, facts about how they are related back to me, and/or, importantly, what I do with 
them.  It is this sharing transaction that, as I will show in this paper, is at the center of  the flow of  5
information I referred to above. For example, the National Security Agency, a component of  the 
Defense Department is legally able to survey international and domestic communications under the 
FISA Amendment Act signed under President George W. Bush. Under this act, “foreign intelligence 
information,” which is the primary excuse for data collection, retention, and dissemination, is 
defined incredibly broadly.  This vagueness means that Americans, their domestic and international 6
calls, locations, and search histories are subject to government acquisition. This publicity suggests 
that the data of  every American and foreigner, not simply those they consider “a threat” (which also 
has an extraordinarily broad definition), is available for legal procurement by the government.  What 7
is ours, in fact, is at the disposal of  the government (and corporations, which I speak less of, that are 
also guilty of  procuring data in a manner once thought to be barred).  While problematic methods 8
of  collection are built into the law, practices— in terms of  what they are able to collect and why—
3. As it will become clear throughout this paper, that something should be kept from others, is independent of  
its moral status or social stigma. Having something to hide is not based on criminality or embarrassment but out of  self-
preservation, the possibility of  a continued notion of  self  that is simultaneously changing and handling that change.
4. Judith Jarvis Thomson inquires into the violation of  rights and what that means for privacy in general by 
presenting several imaginary, yet very real, cases in which privacy might be being violated. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
“The Right to Privacy,” Philosophical Dimensions of  Privacy, ed. Ferdinand David Schoeman, (Cambridge University Press, 
1984): 272–289, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625138.012. I am here thinking of  her example of  a passerby listening to a 
fight she is having at home heard through open windows versus a neighbor training an amplifier to listen in (273). For 
most of  the paper, she attempts to determine whether these two scenarios, or one or the other, violates the right to 
privacy and to what degree. I point this example out to note that she uses it because in both cases, intuitive discomfort is 
palpable and a springboard for her argument.
5. As I will show in detail below, I do not use the term “anonymity” to refer to simple namelessness, nor do I 
put identity solely in that basket. Rather, as I argue, it is related to a flow of  traits, behavioral propensities and embodied 
habits or hobbies, used to distinguish someone (not externally appropriate an identity for them).
6. Alex Abdo and Jameel Jaffer, “How the NSA's Surveillance Procedures Threaten Americans’ Privacy,” 
American Civil Liberties Union, April 26, 2015, www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/how-nsas-surveillance-
procedures-threaten-americans-privacy.
7. Abdo and Jaffer, “How the NSA's Surveillance Procedures Threaten Americans’ Privacy.”
8. Adam Uzialko, “How and Why Businesses Collect Consumer Data,” Business News Daily, August 3 2018, 
www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html.
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also exceed lawful categories.  9
 So, why does having nothing to hide from the government still produce discomfort from the 
acquisition of  information in the personal, and in this case technological, field? There is an 
underlying aspect of  personhood that is extremely important to uphold and protect  anonymity. I 
would like to suggest that anonymity articulates the boundary for personal rights violation, in the 
form of  exhibition of  traits, as well as potential for human flourishing. This internal space, which 
anonymity seeks to protect, is perhaps to remain space—as such, not to be filled in—where I can 
connect with my most undisguised self.  This part of  the self  is to be the aspect of  personhood 10
most free from any third party intrusion, existing only for oneself. 
II. Anonymity 
In order to begin my analysis of  anonymity it is useful to start with a working definition of  
the term. I define anonymity in the following way:  
 The inability of  any second or third party, beyond oneself, to connect the flow 
between traits that act as an underlying structural association of  social identification 
that is deliberately unpublicized.    11
As I will show later, this definition is closely related to the work of  Kathleen A. Wallace, which 
emphasizes the sociality of  anonymity, namely that everyone acts and interacts within a social 
context in which they can be identified, which contributes to the exhibition of  their traits.  But first, 12
let us take a look at each of  the key terms in the definition above. By traits, I mean physical 
characteristics, such as hair color and height, but also habits or actions, as well as the relationships 
between them and their intimate, exclusive relationship to myself.  
Expanding on the definition of  anonymity above, consider the following example: For me to 
remain anonymous in one respect would mean that a second or third party observer is incapable of  
connecting the fact that I am graduating from the University of  Oregon, my address on my license 
is not in Oregon, and that I am communicating with landlords in Portland. If  one of  these traits 
were taken individually, it would place me in a different geographical location along the West coast. 
9. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law,” The New York Times, April 16, 
2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=us. 
10. I do not mean to pinpoint free will or selfhood, but to contribute a conversation on becoming attuned to 
being anonymous to others as well as oneself, which may be productive and weighty. Free will and the self  are concepts 
extremely tied up in philosophy on the whole, and these topics themselves are not covered sufficiently in this thesis. 
Instead, my view comments on the importance of  the control of  one’s own information, and what that might contribute 
to these larger concepts.
11. The traits we display and how they integrate to form a consistency that is identifiable to one person.
12. See Kathleen A. Wallace, “Anonymity,” Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 1, no. 1, (1999): 21–31, 
doi:10.1023/a:1010066509278. 
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Taken together one can ascribe to a story of  where I am from, where I am, and where I am going. 
In other words, the aggregation of  spatial (location) and temporal (near graduation) traits allow a 
third party observer to correctly, or incorrectly, infer possible scenarios as to who I am and what I 
am about to be and do. It is this inference space that anonymity protects.  It is important to note 13
that it is not the traits or throughlines, the connections between the connections of  traits, 
themselves at issue in anonymity. Facts and data point to a story of  someone’s life. Their traits may 
identify them simply in some contexts, but their ability to remain anonymous refers to what is done 
with the information rather than what it contains. Helen Fay Nissenbaum devotes an analysis to the 
ways in which technology has changed in order to facilitate data aggregation and fabrication. This 
example is truly a euphemism for the data that is used in what she calls the “vast enterprise of  
meaning-making [that motivates] a great deal of  collection, storage, and dissemination of  
information.”  My view of  anonymity is more closely related to that of  Wallace, whose view 14
addresses the “noncoordinatability of  traits in a given respect.”  Maintaining anonymity seeks to 15
preserve a lack of  comprehensive correspondence between traits. By using the term 
“correspondence” my framework ties anonymity to social contexts, upon which I will expand later. 
For now, traits identified to one person or a group must stand on the same contextual ground as the 
one identifying them. By “contextual ground” I mean to suggest an outline of  the way in which 
different social networks in which people exist and act connect to one another, providing a 
“context” where detailed and different arenas of  social life become intelligible to others. This 
ground does not mean to suggest a cultural or linguistic similarity, but the exhibition of  traits must 
be able to be understood by other people. I am not considering animal behavior or extremely fringe 
human behavior as exhibiting the same degree of  sociality, though there may be intentional 
interaction within these networks. To comprehend the flow of  traits, they must be recognizable in 
comparison to others’ on a social human level.  
Now, let me clarify what I mean by the flow between traits. The flow between traits can be 
conceived of  as the abstracted overarching coherence of  one person’s identity that allows for traits 
as well as throughlines to be tied together in order to denote a singular person or group. This 
13. In training predictive algorithms, the accuracy of  capturing each individual instance is not really prioritized, 
whether it is a correct categorization of  an individual or an incorrect one, the system will use it as raw data from which 
to learn and adapt. See Amoore, “Data Derivatives,” 32-33.
14. Helen Fay Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of  Social Life, (Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 45. I dedicate much of  what follows to the actionability of  data, but Nissenbaum also highlights an 
important aspect of  that narrative: that inventories of  information can be “effectively moved into massive aggregations 
and disaggregated into usable chunks … Furthermore, information begets information: as data is structured and 
analyzed it yields implications, consequences, and predictions” (37).
15. Wallace, “Anonymity,” 24.
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perspective of  materialized traits that are mapped onto an actual person does not imply a solely 
superimposed identity, although to remain anonymous is considered to be necessarily in relation to 
others. A flow is by definition not rooted or stagnant, its movement is its constancy, but the flow 
connects the dots between traits, and traits are always socially contextualized if  they are to be 
recognized by others. It is important to note that anonymity, by these characterizations, is a broader 
term rooted in much more than safeguarding a name. The underlying structural association within 
these contexts is a throughline of  traits that exists for the identification of  a singular person. When 
this flow between traits is shielded, so that links cannot be made and, thus, one cannot be identified 
by a second or third party, one achieves anonymity.  
As I briefly discussed above, in this definition I have departed from the widely accepted 
definition that ties anonymity to namelessness, the kind of  definition that one may even find in a 
Merriam Webster dictionary. Being anonymous commonly refers to forms of  pseudonyms or being 
unrecognizable. Because this paper focuses on the implications of  contemporary data technologies, 
it is important to note, as Nissenbaum writes, that when it comes to contemporary technology “the 
electronic medium now offers many points of  entry, some of  which may be even more effective 
than a name.”  Here, Nissenbaum refers to the way in which data can be inferred about a person 16
through technology without ever knowing his or her name. Consider the following example, 
someone who shops at Home Depot and donates to charities that construct homes pro bono. The 
unnamed person can be located geographically and can be typified by her interests. This unnamed 
individual points out to Nissenbaum that there are other ways to gather information that are even 
more satisfactory than through a name. What “effectiveness” is getting at in the Nissenbaum quote 
above is included in the definition: relations of  traits become accessible and may pinpoint a person 
or group. In a later section, I will explore in detail the related notion of  “actionability” in this data, a 
concept used by Louise Amoore. These two facts about this person may be traced to her email, from 
which she is updated on Home Depot and her favorite charities, then targeted for advertisements on 
landscaping designs and manipulated into buying expensive tools, thereby making the data 
actionable. Capturing the electronic medium that Nissenbaum highlights requires a more thorough 
definition of  anonymity, which will clarify my discussion on autonomy and privacy. Nissenbaum is 
concerned for this external identification (that of  locating by another), but on which she does not 
elaborate. The effectiveness of  the entry is what is at stake in risking anonymity and what it seeks to 
preserve. At stake is a zone of  personhood, deliberately nonspecific and undefinable, wherein traits 
16. Helen Fay Nissenbaum, “The Meaning of  Anonymity in an Information Age,” The Information Society, vol. 
15, no. 2 (1999): 141–144, doi:10.1080/019722499128592, 142.
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and throughlines are melded into one another and one may grow.  
 Anonymity can include namelessness, but namelessness is only a portion of  the larger 
concept of  anonymity. In this paper, I will be using a version of  anonymity connected to 
recognizable traits of  identity and the flow of  their linkages. At first sight, the concept of  
namelessness seems in fact a viable way to think of  anonymity because the term denotes a certain 
removal of  a part of  identity. As mentioned above, Nissenbaum exemplifies nameless anonymity as 
“people strolling through a foreign city” in which “no one knows who they are.”  There is power in 17
this type of  anonymity because being able to roam without recognition puts less anticipatory 
pressure, such as expecting how one will act in a foreign city setting based on already knowing their 
habits, on any one person. There is a lighter version of  responsibility to be held. Being 
unrecognizable can sometimes mean having the freedom to be anyone at that given moment 
unbeholden to previous duties. However, even in these examples one can see that anonymity is 
much more complex than a name, especially in an information age sustained by electronic data 
gathering systems, as previously mentioned. In the first two examples about location on the West 
coast and shopping/donating both in relation to home repair, external agents can see what I am 
doing while I nevertheless remain nameless and a stranger to them. In an information age knowing 
people’s habits and activities allows a system to at least typify me, at most use what I do for 
predictive purposes. Thus namelessness is only the surface of  the traceability of  someone, where the 
availability of  traits and their manifestation also act as key identifiers.  As Nissenbaum notes, these 18
systems can link bits and pieces of  online information to a person or group without ever knowing a 
name, and the information they can accumulate goes much deeper than a name.  In the data 19
gathering systems to which I refer, search history, online purchases, tax returns, and many more 
items of  information are bound to one person and can reveal more about that person without ever 
knowing her name (this information can all be gathered from what is stored on any one computer). 
These items are relevant to anonymity because they are not simply pieces of  information. Pieced 
17. Nissenbaum, “The Meaning of  Anonymity in an Information Age,” 141.
18. Here, a proper name does indeed act as a “rigid designator,” which “designates the same object in all 
possible worlds in which that object exists and never designates anything else.” Joseph LaPorte, “Rigid Designators,” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/
entries/rigid-designators. The object being identified when called out by name can remain that very object throughout 
different contexts. But, I am suggesting here, that the patterns of  the flow of  our traits also point to, by way of  
identification, to a singular person or group as well. Though the flow of  traits is more malleable and subject to change 
than a proper name, it still acts as a rigid designator because the object remains the same, and the object remains the 
same within different social contexts. If  that object, the anonymous person, is the same person in various social spheres, 
then the flow of  their traits provides a more calculated rigid designator than simply her name, which likely is not needed 
to place traits on to a person.
19. Nissenbaum, “The Meaning of  Anonymity in an Information Age,” 142.
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together, they create a story (whether or not it is accurate), that are springboards from which 
governments, institutions, companies, and private interests target people and tell them who they are. 
Hence, because of  the intricacy of  human participation in social life, in this paper I will be using an 
account of  anonymity tied to networks of  relation that go much deeper than a name. As I will show 
later in detail, the insufficiency of  the name is what lies in the incalculable forms of  knowledge in 
the form of  the elusive self  and why the actionability of  data and the gaps between data are far 
more important than pinning down the points of  entry that negate anonymity.  
 Consider now that whether or not my data depicts something worth investigating or 
prosecuting is not up to me to decide—governments and corporations can manipulate data in 
general and to their advantage. Amoore cites the ontology of  association as implying a relational 
quality between data points that becomes actionable, able to act upon.  The intangible link between 20
data points is not concrete in itself, rather becomes actionable because the association and 
correlation between data is legitimized, even though it is an absence instead of  something positive 
used. There is a level of  abstraction based “precisely on absence, on what is not known, on the very 
basis of  uncertainty.”  The potential consequence is an “amalgam of  disaggregated data, inferring 21
across the gaps to derive a lively and alert new form of  data derivative.”  This associative method 22
of  interpretation can be dangerous, even if  the data does not necessarily say so. For example, 
becoming a security risk at the airport is based on data such as checked luggage, method of  
payment, location leaving from and going to, and ethnicity. The associative method ties these pieces 
of  information together to create a picture of  a threatening person who is then subjected to 
interrogation and often racism. 
Let us now return to the definition of  anonymity I provided above. Social context is taken as 
a prerequisite to the coordinability of  traits, as traits cannot stand alone within an intricate 
patchwork of  community, notably in the technological context where platforms are interconnected 
by people and databases. People’s traits can be thought of  as their active expression—what people 
do characterizes parts of  who they are, and when traits overlap and correlate with each other, their 
aggregation forms a fuller picture of  who one is on the whole. Traits are not solely different patterns 
of  behavior but how they are manifested in various and overlapping ways. For example, one person 
may have a hat collection, a consumer pattern, and use each style of  hat for a different outdoor 
activity she enjoys—running, cycling, hiking, etc. These are traits in themselves and also may, for 
20. Amoore, “Data Derivatives,” 27.
21. Amoore, “Data Derivatives,” 27.
22. Amoore, “Data Derivatives,” 27.
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instance, suggest she is a pale person that likes spending time outside. Wallace’s work highlights that 
people and their traits are always socially contextualized, which allows them to be placeable within a 
social realm at the outset.  Someone who is completely off  the grid is not anonymous because her 23
traits and the flow between them are not in the same sphere as others, and so they are not placeable 
in the language of  traits agreed upon that are socially accessible. Thus, I agree with Wallace in that 
anonymity is not simply unknownness, in the case of  being unaware of  someone’s existence, but 
rather being cognizant of  someone’s existence without identifying a person or group from the 
information available about them. Instead, anonymity shields one’s identity located within a social 
context that would naturally allow a window into the flow of  their traits that makes them not only 
visible but identifiable. For example, one can be visible without being identifiable. In the case of  
anonymous support groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, a name is stated along with the literal 
visibility of  one’s physical presence in the room, but that person is not identifiable beyond that 
circle. Wallace deems “network,” “order,” and “location” within these structures broadly as social 
contexts, where the examples she gives are economic, geographical, linguistic, etc. and one’s position 
within these orders.  An order contains several networks of  relations that overlap with other orders24
—for example the market and consumer networks belong to both the economic and political 
orders.  These orders make sociality more precise in examining the contemporaneousness of  traits 25
in other sectors, opening up the way in which traits, behaviors, and habits overlap in one person’s life 
and with others’. The possibility of  disclosure of  identity in different sectors is extremely important 
to anonymity for potentially divulging choice information.  Divulging one’s own information, or 26
pointing out the flow of  traits in order to be identified, introduces the agent as a gatekeeper for his 
or her own identification. This permeability folds a layer of  autonomy into the function of  
anonymity.  
Because traits in themselves, like data points, provide only so much information on a subject, 
topic or person, the flow between them is a more apt conception of  understanding the operation of  
the flow between traits as opposed to description of  the traits themselves. More literally I use the 
term flow to indicate connection. Also, I use the term “flow” to indicate changeability, in terms of  
growth, development, and shifting interests (for better or worse). In developing new hobbies, habits, 
or traits themselves, there remains a flow qua throughline that may solidify identity even through its 
obligatory changes (whether it shifts a little or changes completely over time). There are necessary 
23. Wallace, “Anonymity,” 21-31.
24. Wallace, “Anonymity,” 25-26.
25. Wallace, “Anonymity,” 26.
26. By “choice information” I mean to introduce the controllability of  data that is at least seemingly one’s own.
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linkages and associations between traits but the practice of  their lived embodiment for a person is 
constantly shifting. In this sense, I am referring to the developing to which most everyone is subject 
yet of  which one is not necessarily aware. I am pointing to the sense of  changing traits and thus how 
their manifestations change as a natural part of  personhood. I doubt none of  us are who we were, 
even if  our hobbies and activities have remained the same. Development here is intentionally 
somewhat shallow and ought not to be taken positively or pejoratively; this is simply a recognition 
and allowance for variation in traits over time.  
 All this is not meant to delve into the intricate philosophical debates surrounding the nature 
of  the soul or of  personal identity, however the throughline can be said to be that which renders the 
same person identifiable while her traits and their manifestation change. For example, a student from 
Iowa that grew up on a farm may be graduating from the University of  Oregon with a degree in 
Environmental Studies. That student previously showed her enjoyment for the outdoors by farming 
and producing vegetables for the farmer’s market. Now, her enjoyment for the outdoors has shifted 
into protecting farmers through policy and she spends time talking to people in their communities, 
outside, but also advises local politicians on the wants of  this population. She has developed, her 
interests have changed, but she remains herself. In the more literal (former) sense, flow signifies a 
more fluid interrelation between traits that may connect or disconnect with other traits of  one 
person—a caveat that Wallace points to but does not expand upon when she says that people are a 
plurality of  traits that are not each related to every other.  Thus, the flow between traits is perhaps 27
the least material or observable aspect of  anonymity, yet it is nonetheless the most definite. Traits 
change but a flow will remain. The space between traits is seemingly the most empty. But, I 
emphasize, here as well and throughout this thesis, that negativity can be productive. Traits are 
established and classified by their positive manifestations, how they come to be in the world, but 
even though the flow between traits is not positive in the sense that it impresses activities and data 
on the world, it is generative in the sense of  creating a foundation and conditions on which 
occurrences happen conventionally in the world. The flow between traits is similar to how I will 
conceive of  privacy later on as a network that is somewhat groundless but still substantially rooted 
and active in sensible connections between more concrete variables.  
III. Privacy, Autonomy, and Anonymity  
In this section I will introduce the way in which the concepts of  privacy, autonomy, and 
anonymity fundamentally operate in concert with one another. As I will show, anonymity is a central 
focus in both privacy and autonomy, privacy directly pointing directly inward, and autonomy 
27. Wallace, “Anonymity,” 26-27.
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controlling the publication of  that internal and personal space. The space created for oneself  to 
grow through those boundaries is made possible by the ability to protect it, anonymity.  
Privacy 
Before considering the right to privacy, I will outline some of  the conceptions of  privacy 
itself  in the literature. There is considerable debate on the term and how we use it in philosophy, law, 
and colloquial speech. Firstly, some authors believe privacy is a stand-alone concept while others 
believe it is derivative.  The latter I will discuss in relation to the right to privacy, but I would like to 28
consider the former in order to later see if  the right can be breached or forfeited. Herman T. Tavani 
delineates four distinct kinds of  privacy: physical/accessibility, decisional, psychological/mental, and 
informational.  Each is also distinct in type of  harm that may be accounted for when the respective 29
type of  privacy is violated. Physical privacy is fairly obvious in its spatial manner, focusing on the 
capacity for harm “through physical access to a person” or her possessions.  Foul play in this 30
category of  privacy may harm the victim in a direct sense. This conception is clearly not the only 
one and not sufficient, notably in a technological environment where there is no materiality.  31
Examples may be found in stalking or reading someone’s diary. Stalking infringes on someone's 
personal physical space from afar yet significantly impedes in a personal way, whereas reading 
someone’s diary also invades physical space, the significant harm done is not physical but rather 
mental. Much like the technological context, privacy is violated without a name, not really physically, 
and in a way that is inhibiting from within. These examples highlight the inadequacy of  considering 
only this type of  privacy. Secondly, decisional privacy is that of  freedom from interference affecting 
one’s choices and the ability to make them, such as states’ rights to deny access to counseling on 
birth control.  This non-intrusive type of  privacy is exclusionary in the processes leading up to and 32
the moment of  decision making—what is questionable here is who or what plays a part in shifting 
the way one carries out one’s actions. The harm done is more subtle and can be, consequently, more 
28. For his extended discussion of  these differing conceptions, see Herman T. Tavani, “Informational Privacy: 
Concepts, Theories, and Controversies” in The Handbook of  Information and Computer Ethics, eds. Kenneth Einar Himma 
and Herman T. Tavani, 131–164, 1st ed., (Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2009), doi:10.1002/9780470281819.ch6.
29. Tavani, “Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories, and Controversies,” 132.
30. Herman T. Tavani, “Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories, and Controversies,” 135.
31. The first type of  privacy (physical) and the last type (informational) implicate different conceptions of  
property. I am referring to three classifications Ali M. Al-Khouri uses to describe personal information. Ali M. Al-
Khouri, “Data Ownership: Who Owns 'My Data’?,” International Journal Of  Management & Information Technology, vol. 2, no. 
1 (2012): 1–8, doi:10.24297/ijmit.v2i1.1406. They are observed, or “captured” data that can simply be recorded, 
volunteered, which is shared or given, and inferred from the first two kinds of  raw data. For example, I can go to the 
park and observe the amount of  times an adult helps a child on the play set (observed). I can also take a survey which 
will give me similar information (volunteered). Al-Khouri gives the example of  a credit score, which is a numerical value 
and interpretation of  spending habits and financial habits (3).
32. Tavani, “Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories, and Controversies,” 136.
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manipulative. Third, Tavani describes privacy in terms of  psychological and mental states including 
protecting one’s thoughts and capacity for thinking free from intrusion.  Similar to decisional 33
privacy, psychological/mental privacy attempts to reserve the internal sphere for oneself. In contrast, 
this latter category focuses more on personality and identity (ripe for harm in this case) than 
decision making. The last conception that Tavani discusses is informational privacy, simply the 
restriction of  collecting and using personal data—quite relevant to the technological context —the 34
speed at which information is exchanged, and duration in the form of  storage, writ large this last 
type of  privacy in the current conversation on privacy in general.   35
Before I move on, I would like to discuss why the psychological/mental in congruence with 
the decisional conception of  privacy are most relevant to my thesis. Psychological/mental privacy is 
more subtle than physical privacy, as it is not so much what knowledge has been gained or 
possessions have been taken, but what Mark Alfino contends is that “the very act of  the intrusion 
that prevents [us] from thinking or concentrating on [our] life or actions.”  Decisional privacy 36
operates similarly, in that the intrusion comes not in the form of  epistemic advantage or potential 
harm, but in that the act of  infiltration that can disturb one’s modus operandi.  Therein lies the way 37
in which jeopardized privacy phenomenologically feels uncomfortable and logistically inhibits the 
way people are, though what may be included or under the larger concept of  privacy is still at issue. 
And, I would suggest, that the way that they are, or what is obligatory for their sensing a compulsion 
for privacy in general, is the recognition that there is something personal to keep to oneself, and it 
33. Tavani, “Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories, and Controversies,” 137-138.
34. Tavani, “Informational Privacy: Concepts, Theories, and Controversies,” 139. There is an already-
established use of  privacy in the debate on collecting personal data. Colin Koopman’s book How We Became Our Data 
details the genealogy of  datafied information, in which he comments on these topics. See Colin Koopman, How We 
Became Our Data: A Genealogy of  the Informational Person, (University of  Chicago Press, 2019). I am not, nor is Tavani, the 
first to comment on privacy and technology. I recognize that there is a longstanding history and deliberation on the 
subject. 
35. While I agree with and respect aspects of  Tavani’s endeavors in tackling the vague and unsatisfactory 
definitions of  privacy, I believe he outlines the categories too stringently, not allowing for enough overlap. Delving into 
his delineations only pointed out how imbricated they are. But in contrast to Tavani, my view is not opposed to the 
overlapping of  the conceptions of  privacy. The overlapping is necessary for a more accurate picture of  what we mean 
when we say or use privacy in debate. He does not necessarily advocate for a strict separation out of  context, but their 
entanglement is integral to the way in which privacy affects one person on several levels at once as well as operates 
interpersonally. The categories are more intertwined than he lets them be in the paper, whether or not he does so 
intentionally.
36. Mark Alfino, “Information Ethics in the Workplace: Misplacing Privacy,” Journal of  Information Ethics, vol. 
10, no. 2 (2001): 5-8, http://libproxy.uoregon.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/
scholarly-journals/information-ethics-workplace-misplacing-privacy/docview/1850663213/se-2?accountid=14698, 7.
37. By “modus operandi” I am prioritizing the way in which embody their thoughts and act them out.
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can be helpful to do so.  The ability to privatize personal space and knowledge is why I have found 38
that anonymity is paramount in relation to secrecy, privacy, and integrity of  thought that may come 
from it. By recognizing the way these two specific types of  privacy subtly demonstrate a stress on 
genuine action when they are compromised, I am pointed back to a reserved personal sphere that is 
separate and necessary for operation in relation to acting with minimal outside influence.  The 39
opportunity to create this space comes from the ability to shield it. Thus, again, anonymity is a 
required first for whatever may come of  this space subsequently.  
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s conception of  privacy is that of  a cluster of  other rights from 
which the right to privacy is derived. In “The Right to Privacy,” Thomson proposes a number and 
variety of  scenarios through which she evaluates the potential for violating the right to privacy or 
other rights less frequently considered a part of  the privacy equation. Some examples she considers 
include: someone stopping to listen to her and her husband fight overheard through open windows, 
using an amplifier to listen in to a public conversation, and possessing and hiding a secret 
pornographic picture.  She questions which rights exactly are being violated in each scenario, as it 40
seems that the right to privacy is a general blanket term, but in these cases, the right to one’s own 
person, the right to private property, and positive/negative rights (in using or protecting property) 
are more likely the rights that are directly compromised. Thomson is unsure if  “there are any rights 
in the right to privacy cluster which aren’t also in some other right cluster,” and she suspects that 
“the right to privacy is everywhere overlapped by other rights.”  Thomson concludes that we have 41
one right in the cluster because we can appeal to another right in the cluster, and that “it is because I 
have these rights that I have a right to privacy,” making the right to privacy “‘derivative’ in this sense: 
it is possible to explain in the case of  each right in the cluster how come we have it without ever 
once mentioning the right to privacy.”  The right to privacy acts only as an umbrella under which 42
stand the actual rights that are violated. Despite being an umbrella, the right to privacy can only be 
called upon, for Thomson, by a descendancy of  the rights actually violated. The right to privacy is 
38. When talking about “private” information, I am diverging from the commonly held view that understands it 
as information ownership, employing terms such as “intellectual property” or “private property rights.” Private ownership 
is often thought of  as the delegation of  objects or information to a person or group who maintain the rights to govern 
or use them/it to whatever degree they want. In contrast, I am interested in privacy in the way in which the governing 
body governs and in what she shelters.
39. I am extremely doubtful of  eliminating all outside influence in one’s thoughts or how they may be carried 
out. By this I mean to say that there is a malleable reserved personal sphere, but it cannot be wholly separated from what 
shapes it. In talking about exhibited traits embodied and carried out, I am not operating within only the internal personal 
sphere, and insofar as I am working in social contextuality, there is necessarily affectation.
40. Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” Philosophical Dimensions of  Privacy (1984): 272–289.              
41. Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” 284.
42. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” 287.
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inferential from the cluster of  these other rights, acting as epiphenomenal and inactive, thus 
untouchable in itself.  43
 The right to privacy may act as a wide-ranging and unspecific term for Thomson, but that 
does exclude it from being productive for me. Though it may not necessarily be mentioned in the 
conversation about which rights are violated, the comprehensiveness of  the cluster of  rights under 
the right to privacy is not moot; it may well be that the right to privacy is the precondition for the 
other rights to occur at all. The other rights could not exist without the grounding concept of  the 
right to privacy, as a private zone must first be established for any personal right to be violated, and 
likely could not be articulated as such without at least a general theoretical privacy positively 
disclosing other rights. In Thomson’s examination, the rights of  property, preservation of  life, and 
bodily freedom are all predicated on other similar rights, rights that are explained by appealing to 
other rights that also include them.  It is in this sense that the right to privacy is overarching but 44
inaccessible for Thomson. But, while I think she is right to question what rights are expressly 
violated, notably in a legal and punitive setting, I do not believe that the right to privacy ought to be 
thought of  as idle or static. Instead, it is the right to privacy that constantly acts as a foundation on 
which other rights are to be built. The other rights would be free floating if  not for the right to 
privacy, which may perhaps remain unclear or intangible, but also allows for the other rights to have 
weight in their own contexts. Similarly, anonymity allows for the occurrence of  flourishing as a layer 
over which development may unfold, but without which might be sporadic and deficient. By this I 
mean that anonymity is a precondition for creating space for autonomy and, while it may remain 
invisible, holding a space containing the potential for anonymity gives a level of  security that is 
generative, which I will delve into in subsequent sections. Personhood, property, and protection are 
all at stake in this example, where information and thought are thwarted; anonymity as the 
imperceptible is brought to the fore as it becomes the main component of  felt and rationalized 
inhibition.  
Autonomy  
 At this point, I have outlined the way in which I am using the term “privacy” and why I am 
43. Epiphenomenalism is the philosophic view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain but 
do not have an effect on any physical events. William Robinson, “Epiphenomenalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/epiphenomenalism. The 
mental events synthesized by the physical events do not have an active role in events playing out. This term lays claim on 
Thomson’s argument because she deems the right to privacy as such by saying that the right to privacy has no causal 
power in the matter of  violation of  rights. Instead, the right to privacy is equivalent to the mental events that do not 
actually affect the physical events playing out, the right to property, person, etc. that are violated.
44. Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” 286.
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accepting the overlapping of  the term’s definition—I think it right to allow this ambiguity for the 
sake of  comprehensiveness. Privacy is a key aspect of  this thesis because it points toward a personal 
boundary that is valued and with which we continuously play. The limits of  this boundary are tested 
in what we show and allow people to see, granting autonomous action in being able to singularly 
stretch that boundary. What autonomy and privacy together provide is a foundation for deliberate 
anonymity. For my thesis, this discussion below on the origins and legitimacy of  autonomy will play 
into the conditions that are created for genuine autonomy, from which we can consider the way 
anonymity also perpetuates these conditions. Whether or not self-governing can be pinned down is 
not the answer I am after, but rather the question of  whether anonymity is primary in setting up the 
consideration of  the reasoning, motivation, and influence that goes into the functions of  self-
government in the first place.  
 Personal autonomy is broadly recognized in the philosophic literature as the type of  self-
governing that is necessary to being a full moral agent, one who initiates one’s actions.  The singular 45
power of  the agent herself  to act begets the authority over her own actions, as she is the only one 
able to exercise this power over herself. Thus, her actions are entitled to her only by way of  her 
commitments to acting because they are not entitled to anyone else.  The philosophical debate lies 46
in whether influences on the agent’s actions erode personal autonomy, putting into question the 
motivation of  actions and, controversially, how they might affect self-governing. For example, 
someone on a diet seemingly has a choice to not eat sugar, but sugar is also one of  the most 
addictive substances, and diets are a common fad. The debate in this scenario is whether the 
chemical predilection to eat sugar and/or societal pressure compromises personal autonomy because 
self-governing may not be considered a genuine choice.  There are several modes of  thought that 47
follow on whether agent’s actions can be fully, partially, or irrelevantly tied to external influences.   48
45. Sarah Buss and Andrea Westlund, “Personal Autonomy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, Spring 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/personal-autonomy/.
46. Buss and Westlund, “Personal Autonomy.”
47. In this case, a genuine choice is not only one free of  external coercion in the form of  social, physical, or 
psychological determination, but also one in which the agent can explain her reasoning, which is devoid of  external 
influence and the actions that follow from it, but, again, I am not sure if  this is possible.
48. Approaches include but are not limited to: the coherentist, reasons-responsive, responsiveness-to-reasoning, 
and incompatibilist approaches which discuss the conditions for which autonomy may or may not be undermined or 
solidified by the motives behind them. Buss and Westlund characterize the coherentist as the most internal, in that the 
agent’s motivations correspond to a mental state. For the other approaches, this is insufficient as, respectively, to really 
self-govern she must reckon with the reasons behind her motives, examine the motives of  others and adjust her own, or 
recognize that all motives can be attributed to an external source. They are not mutually exclusive; in fact motivation as 
attributed to other factors and reflected upon is likely laden within each argument. Here, I take the position of  those that 
seriously scrutinize the motivations as opposed to the foremost approach that is satisfied by the most surface level 
motives that prompt action.
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 The aspects of  the approaches—coherentist, reasons-responsive, responsiveness-to-
reasoning, and incompatibilist—address from where and how much significance motivation and 
influence can be placed in personal autonomy. Respectively, as listed above, the agent’s actions may 
concur with what she wants to do, consider the reasoning behind motives, adjust one’s motives 
according to that reflection of  others’ motives, and write off  the possibility that all motives can be 
attributed to external factors, challenging self-governing in itself.  They each point to a fine line of  49
autonomy that is difficult to identify: “self-government requires two points of  view: that of  the 
governing authority, and that of  the governed,” which are one and the same—the agent.  Self-50
governing is predicated on self-reflection which allows this distance between the one that governs 
and the one that is governed (though in considering self-government, they are the same person). 
Additionally, the action of  the agent must have some basis that cannot be alienated from herself, 
which is the desire to govern oneself  (the agent wishes to govern her actions and does act)—so she 
cannot be infinitely distanced from herself.  I would like to suggest that the space wherein 51
simultaneous distance, between one who is governing and one who is governed, and proximity, the 
one who acts is the one whose motives motivate, are generated is in an ability to remain anonymous. 
These conditions under which autonomous action may come to fruition are established by 
anonymity by a gap that is procured between myself  and myself  (again, the governor and governed 
in one), between the actions to which I am entitled as the agent and their materialization in the 
world (closely aligned with the exhibition and throughlines of  my traits), and the separation between 
those. We test the boundaries of  privacy and, by crafting that self-reflection that lends to self-
authorship, we grow out of  and into that space that we constantly redefine.  
Anonymity, again, the inability to connect the flow between traits which act as an underlying 
structural association of  social identification that is deliberately unpublicized, is necessarily 
embedded into and brightens autonomy. Autonomy opens up that space wherein action is animated 
by oneself, creating an internal distance as well as between oneself  and others, as mentioned above. 
But the value of  anonymity and its location in autonomy cannot be understated. To retain 
anonymity, to be able to disconnect others from the flow between one’s traits, is to save some of  
that space for oneself. The thought that creates action for the agent in that space can happen 
without privacy or anonymity, but at what cost? At risk is not only that space in the main, but also 
one’s relation to that space. I would like to suggest that development and growth, and, importantly, 
49. Buss and Westlund, “Personal Autonomy.”
50. Buss and Westlund, “Personal Autonomy.”
51. Buss and Westlund, “Personal Autonomy.”
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room for ambiguity in these realms, is what determines humanity in the sense of  slack and novelty. 
To keep some of  oneself  to oneself  allows for choice information to be selected at all. I will move 
into selectivity in privacy and autonomy in the next section, but I also want to underscore its 
importance here, where that exclusive, individual, and dynamic aspect of  oneself  is cultivated and 
shared.  
Centrality of  Anonymity  
What I will be calling the “centrality of  anonymity” has to do with what anonymity does. 
While I have begun a preliminary analysis and explanation of  anonymity as a term, here I will 
explore the way in which anonymity functions and what comes out of  a primarily impenetrable 
space or landscape that retains the possibility of  access by others according to the one who protects 
it. My conception of  the space that anonymity constitutes is not quite a conventional tabula rasa 
argument of  empiricism—that of  a cognitive blank slate filled in by sensual experience. Though I 
will be referring to the experience of  anonymity, I do not mean to endorse an account of  anonymity 
as a personal clean slate that gradually becomes besmirched with the muddy details of  life. Rather, I 
believe the space that one’s anonymity creates is the opposite of  blank or empty—it is quite full with 
the flow between traits described above in what anonymity seeks to render uncoordinated. This 
space is simply not available to a third party until the anonymous one decides to make it so, at which 
point a part of  her anonymity is lost to whom she shares information with. As the flow between 
traits is safeguarded, one can use one’s rights to the degree that she connects with them in the 
innermost personal sphere and, thus, can grow from this place that only she knows. Anonymity 
functions as a space or landscape uniquely for one’s own experience to cultivate, and that space is 
valuable for its permission of  distanced association between agent and others, furthering a more 
fully examined association between agent and herself. What is shared is then tinged with the self-
relation that has been scrutinized for and by no one other than oneself. By this I mean that the 
privilege of  anonymity is a precondition for genuine self-relation. It is not based on what may 
happen to the information that comes out of  it, nor is it based on who will see or recognize it. In 
fact, it is quite the opposite. Anonymity takes the debate on the role that motives play in autonomy 
discussed above and furthers it by asking, who cares? Rather, perhaps, why does it matter? 
Anonymity reserves the freedom to act in the world to the agent by granting the agent the 
preliminary area of  reflection wherein she can develop her actions before they occur for her own 
contemplation. Anonymity is primary to autonomy, which may follow suit by the actual self-
government, and to seclusion, which is decided upon based on the ability to remain anonymous or 
not. But it is first based on the fact that one could remain anonymous, and to the integrity of  
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personal information, which is made possible by the control of  that information. It allows for 
information or rights to occur at all. Perhaps to have a secret with one’s self  is to produce both an 
important grounding and an important springboard for development.  
The connection between anonymity and privacy is not one of  primacy or necessity but one 
of  centrality. Anonymity and privacy are linked in because privacy is rooted in desiring some degree 
of  anonymity or a shield from others, so anonymity acts more fundamentally than privacy does. 
Privacy could be a manifestation of  anonymity in the world or for its own sake; its sources and 
effects are blurry. But anonymity is nowhere near accidental. Again, it is the flow of  traits 
deliberately unpublicized and hidden. By this I mean that anonymity is more central to the argument 
of  a productive and worthwhile inner sphere and more difficult to pin down than privacy is. Most 
examples of  studying personal and public boundaries exude privacy inadvertently, but being 
anonymous is willfully creating a space for oneself. Being private can also be intentional, but 
anonymity is more equipped to engender that landscape to develop. Being private and being 
anonymous work similarly, but being private focuses on the outer sphere whereas anonymity focuses 
on the inner sphere. By this I mean that to remain private is to push the world and its contents away, 
whereas to remain anonymous is to invite them in selectively, cultivate the sense of  self  for self ’s 
sake, and then expose the parts that are self-authorized. This selectivity is what I want to make 
extremely clear as incredibly valuable.  
IV. Implications of  the “Nothing to Hide” Argument 
In order to integrate the practicality of  anonymity and how its value ought to be rationalized 
in the world of  data gathering and analysis technologies, I will discuss an argument often used in 
colloquial and political spheres to discredit privacy and anonymity. Valuing anonymity may change 
the way one considers what she trades in using this reply, I have “nothing to hide,” for a semblance 
of  safety. I suggest that a provision of  intimacy with oneself  ought to be cherished, and only is 
possible through safeguarding parts of  oneself  to and for oneself.  
The “nothing to hide” argument is a common retort that argues for data collection and 
surveillance. Those that use this response to the often unauthorized infiltration of  information are 
under the impression that they have not committed what they deem criminal activity, and so are safe 
from negative disciplinary action, in a legal or stigmatic form. For example I, angrily, may find a 
neighbor opening the mail from my mailbox who seems surprised at my reaction to the invasive act 
he is committing, to which he responds, blithely, well if  you have nothing to hide you should have 
nothing to fear. The argument has serious implications though—in certain contexts it attempts to 
balance privacy and security, often implying that security ought to triumph over trivial data that is 
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not criminal or wrong unless it is, in which case it should be prosecuted.  Since 9/11 there has been 52
a notable increase in government spending and policy-making on surveillance and data collection 
proposed in the form of  protection and safety. The origins of  the argument are not clear, but in a 
statement, it is what Richard Graham, a Member of  Parliament for Gloucester, said in response to a 
government surveillance bill: “if  you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” The 
problematic quote can be further tied back to Minister of  Propaganda for the Nazis, Joseph 
Goebbels who is believed to use it in 1933 leading up to World War II. Where the argument comes 
from is not really important; what is significant, though, is how often it is implied in an institutional 
way as well as between peers. However, there is something amiss in this rebuttal.  
This conditional has laden premises and conclusions that make it problematic on a few 
levels. Firstly, the antecedent suggests that one has something to hide and praises transparency. As I 
have suggested, there are grounds to encourage the internal sphere. However, in this argument, that 
hiddenness is tainted with disapproval whereas I will show below, it ought not be. The consequent 
relies on the premise of  future use and concludes upon its uncertainty. What happens to data is 
characterized, again, by Amoore’s notion of  actionable data, which I will discuss below in addition 
to her understanding of  incalculable futures, entrusted when they shouldn’t be. There is a lot to fear 
from seemingly innocent data, which are really calculations of  the traits and flows between traits that 
make up a person, in the form of  online companies targeting individuals and governments 
convicting and suspecting innocent people based on algorithms with aggregates of  data that inform 
them.  
Actionable Data and Nothing to Hide  
As I stressed earlier, data does not stand alone. As an example, after visiting a sick family 
member in India, you flew out of  Pakistan because of  bad weather in New Delhi. You decided to 
wait until he or she passed away to leave the country, so you cancelled your flight and paid for your 
flight in cash because your credit card was stolen. You have now become a security risk upon 
reentering the United States. Information alone can be innocuous. But what institutions that gather 
it want is not pieces of  information. Rather, they are invested in stories that may be found out to 
locate and stop dangerous people and groups in the name of  protection, but also may be derived, as 
in the case just mentioned. Amoore puts it aptly, “the data derivative is not centered on who we are, 
nor even on what our data says about us, but on what can be imagined and inferred about who we 
might be.”  There may not be anything to hide, and data can still be inadvertently troubling to some 53
52. Solove, “‘I've Got Nothing to Hide,” 747.
53. Amoore, “Data Derivatives,” 28.
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that, in the wrong hands, can be fabricated into something more harmful. The nothing to hide 
argument—shortly, if  there is nothing to hide, there is nothing to fear—can be thrown out when the 
consequent, “nothing to fear,” is negated. In my view, dubious governmental and corporate interests 
are enough cause for concern, negating that there is nothing to hide. But also, less pragmatically but 
nonetheless as significant, there is something to fear in lack of  privacy in general.  
Secrecy  
In addition, the first part of  the nothing to hide argument uses shame and criminality 
implicitly when, in fact, most of  the time when we choose to hide something, it is not out of  fear. 
To go back to the example used in the beginning of  this section, I may not necessarily be hiding 
something incriminating in my mail through which I find my neighbor filching. Perhaps I would 
prefer to keep a love letter written by a faraway partner to myself  for reasons more personal than 
damning. After a simple inquisition one may realize that there are aspects of  private life that do not 
warrant sharing or fearful secrecy per se. Having something to hide does not necessitate that it is 
hidden out of  fear of  retaliation; it can be another way of  saying there are things you would rather 
not be known, which, I  must underscore again, are acceptable and their morality is to be set aside. 
What may come of  that boundary is where the implications of  anonymity and the nothing to hide 
argument meld. Thus, hiding a piece of  one’s self, and likely the exhibitions of  at least some of  one’s 
traits, is not defensive. Perhaps it can be thought of  as more proactive—remaining anonymous by 
guarding parts of  oneself  is progress with no predetermined path. If  some traits and the flow 
between them remain purely personal, then their exhibition is externally novel once purposefully 
revealed, allowing for new connections to be made between oneself  and others. There is a constant 
newness that characterizes personhood through anonymity, and being secret about it does not halt 
development but furthers it.  
The Incalculable  
In addition to her article “Data Derivatives”Amoore writes about correlational inference in 
her 2014 article “Security and the Incalculable,” in which she elaborates on mathematical theory and 
its practical application in the conversation on security. She frames her arguments on incalculability 
within mathematics through the debate between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alan Turing, who spar on 
the distinction between and the valuation of  pure mathematics versus its operation (what it does). 
She sets up her argument by investigating Turing’s 1936 explanation on the role of  integrated 
intuition and ingenuity in math. For him, intuition consists in “‘making spontaneous judgements 
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which are not the result of  conscious trains of  reason’” that are “akin to ‘inspiration.’”  On the 54
other hand, ingenuity consists in “‘aiding the intuition’ through ‘suitable arrangements of  
propositions, and perhaps geometrical figures or drawings.’”  In essence, the spark of  intuition 55
guides the movements of  the math, which is then explained and rendered replicable by ingenuity, 
formalizing and formulating the intuitive processes. Thus, an unsolvable problem for Turing is not 
one barred from achieving the correct answer, but one of  not having a method to explain and redo 
it. She harkens back to her earlier work by emphasizing the associative significance in relations, even 
if  incalculable, as opposed to particular data points. The associative jumps between data points make 
it possible to rely on theories of  possibility that are taken as objective and factual even though they 
necessarily integrate intuition and ingenuity: “what matters are the correspondences and correlations 
between the elements—how they are held together by inferences across the gaps.”  And even 56
though there are unsolvable problems, futures are predictable or actionable, as delved into 
previously, from their connections with one another. In this case, the incalculable is never entirely 
incalculable because it is not in question, rather there is always an arrangement that can be reached 
in advance. This argument focused on ingenuity and forgotten intuitiveness has obvious implications 
on security, which is based on making the future safer by eliminating those thought to be a potential 
threat.  
The expectation to calculate the incalculable is profound for a few reasons. Firstly, what we 
anticipate from our changing data system makes those working with the incalculable culpable. In 
other words, not acting upon the anticipated future renders one guilty according to those most 
concerned with the possible outcomes, even if  certainty is not guaranteed. For instance Amoore 
uses the case of  Italian scientists found guilty for not predicting an earthquake to exemplify that data 
ought always to be actionable.  They were expected to figure out pathways to possibilities, and act 57
on them, despite lack of  confidence in future events and were held accountable for the lives lost at 
their hesitation. Additionally, Amoore points to the threat of  conjecturing with already actionable 
gaps in data as false confidence in calculability. It begs the question of  other “incalculables” that may 
be at stake. To take but one example, Tavani briefly mentions the “self ” and how other authors have 
described it vis-à-vis informational privacy.  I do not mean to contribute an effort to that endeavor, 58
but only wish to state that perhaps the self  is another actionable incalculable. I do not take up any 
54. Alan Turing, cited in Louise Amoore, “Security and the Incalculable,” Security Dialogue, vol. 45, no. 5 (2014): 
423–439, doi:10.1177/0967010614539719, 427.
55. Turing, cited in Amoore, “Security and the Incalculable,” 427.
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one assumption or preconception of  the self, philosophically in this thesis, but I would like to set 
aside space for its ambiguity. By this I mean to say that these overlaps and inconsistencies in the 
debate point to some version of  the self ’s potential for growth. It may act as an incalculable because 
the self  may grow unpredictably but is acted upon by the reactions of  others and oneself. To be 
anonymous is to keep a bit of  oneself  to oneself, leaving room to grow but cutting off  the attempt 
to anticipate and act on those anticipations. As such, anonymity may cultivate a sense of  space for 
oneself  and also space into which one can develop genuinely, with no predisposed plan, and 
technological algorithms and the debates surrounding them threaten this opportunity.  
V. Conclusion  
In this paper, I have argued for the importance of  anonymity, especially in a digital age. I 
defined anonymity as the inability of  any second or third party, beyond oneself, to connect the flow 
between traits which act as an underlying structural association of  social identification that is 
deliberately unpublicized. I argued that anonymity is central to arguments on privacy and autonomy. 
Privacy, while the views on its characteristics and reach are divided, is nonetheless valued for the 
personal sphere it suggests and highlights. Simply, privatization promotes the recognition of  an 
internal space that one keeps to oneself, which ties back to anonymity—in short, our ability to 
maintain that boundary. Autonomy, an agent acting on her own volition, tests that boundary by 
keeping a tight grip on her disclosure of  personal information; by retaining a degree of  anonymity, 
she puts the exhibition of  her traits, and thus herself, in her own hands. Chiefly, being able to remain 
anonymous allows for a space to examine oneself, for oneself, and shape those boundaries and traits. 
In the latter sections of  my thesis, I rebutted the nothing to hide argument in its legitimacy and in 
what it suggests—a depreciation of  anonymity that is plainly regretful.  
Lastly, I would like to add that this thesis is not meant to be prescriptive. While there is 
ample reason to be extremely wary of  technology and the future it will certainly affect, this thesis 
should not be taken as reason to discredit all of  contemporary technology’s advances. There are 
undoubtedly aspects of  technology that are beautiful and inspiring; human connection, medicine, 
education—they are all the better because of  the technology that sustains them. I do, however, 
intend to emphasize that there are serious implications of  personal data that is collected, aggregated, 
disseminated, and acted upon. Growth, personhood, and agency are so tightly attached to the ability 
to be anonymous, and our lack of  recognition of  it will result in erosion retrospective regret if  we 
do not begin to venerate it. I consider this thesis and its analysis to be a preliminary first step in 
articulating the centrality of  anonymity and hope that it serves as the start of  a future conversation 
in which everyone can find a voice. 
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